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SAILORS AND SERVANTS
A PAPER DEALING WITH THE
CONTINUOUS STRUGGLE OF THE PEOPLE
OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
TO RETAIN EFFECTIVE CONTROL
AND DIRECTION OF THEIR
NAVAL ESTABLISHMENT

L. W. CHICK

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A WORKING PAPER IN THE FIELD OF
COMPTROLLERSHIP

L.W. CHICK

THE GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
NAVY GRADUATE COMPTROLLERSHIP PROGRAM

SAILORS AND SERVANTS

A paper dealing with the continuous struggle of the people of the United States of America to retain effective control and direction of their Naval Establishment.

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INTRODUCTION

Since the very beginning of the organized state as a recognizable society the control of its military has been in a fluid equilibrium. The effective powers of the military and the civilian float upon the sea of homage paid to them by the crew of the ship of state and ebbs and flows in proportion to the directed intensity of that homage. Our democratic system of today reflects that same oscillating condition.

It is the theme of this paper that the rise and fall of civil control of the naval forces of the United States is in consonance with the desires of the American people; that these desires have made themselves known through the actions of their elected representatives; that as the populace becomes fearful for their liberty they yield a portion of that liberty to grant to the military the absolute control of the military machine; and that as those fears recede they regain their control by the simple process of denying funds to the military with which to operate.

CHAPTER I

THE INFANCY AND ADOLESCENCE OF
THE NAVAL ORGANIZATION

The origin of the United States Navy by the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation was developed along three lines: (1) the temporary commerce raider forces, to prey on the British shipping supplying the besieged British troops in Boston, (2) the purely military forces on Lake Champlain to resist the expected British invasion from that area, and (3) the sea-going type of a naval organization.¹

The Continental Army wished to deny supplies to the besieged troops, the shipping interests desired to protect their maritime interests, and the Congress wished to obtain their independence of Great Britain. Here we have in the very beginning of the nation's history the combined military, economic and political forces joined in concerted effort to create legislation in favor of a specific form of military activity.

Although the impetus behind this original naval program consisted of the separate forces, the plan was not

¹C. O. Paullin, The Navy of the American Revolution (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 1906), pp. 156-58.

the unanimous opinion of the Congress. The body in Congress supporting the sea-going naval program consisted of the maritime New England Colonies who depended upon their maritime and fishing fleets for their livelihood. The Southern Colonies, not too concerned with maritime enterprise and not bothered particularly by the depredations of the British fleet, were quite vocal in their objections to the expenditure of money for this purpose, but, as they were in the minority, they were unable to prevent the adoption and execution of the measures that resulted in the creation of the Continental Navy.

The American sea-going commerce raider cruisers and Congressionally approved privateers did not play a vital role in the War of the Revolution. They failed to cripple either overseas commerce or military communications of the British Empire. They played a particularly important part in shaping the naval policy of the United States for years to come and therein lies the greatest damage that they wrought. The ships of the Navy took some six million dollars in less than two hundred prizes but the privateers accounted for six hundred prizes and eighteen million dollars in spoils of war.

The people of the nation believed that their war-mobilized Navy was a success because it was self-supporting and had been recruited from their own standing militia of patriotic seamen. They feared the political as well as economic effect of maintaining a navy in peacetime, so during the first term of President Washington and his Financier-Treasurer Robert Morris, the gradual process of liquidating

the Navy began. This liquidation was opposed in theory by Washington and Morris as well as other men of political and military stature. General Washington stated, "No land force can act decisively unless it is accompanied by a maritime superiority."² Thomas Jefferson took the mid-road view, "A small naval force then is sufficient for us and a small one is necessary."³ John Rutledge, a Southerner, stated, "We must hold our country by courtesy unless we have a Navy."⁴ Alexander Hamilton entered into the economic and political ramifications of the program by saying, "With a Navy, American Statesmen could bargain with great advantage for commercial privileges. A price would be set not only upon our friendship but upon our neutrality."⁵ Even though these men were in accord in the idea that a navy was required by the new nation, and that a naval policy and program were required, they were unable to overcome the political and economic obstacles preventing the retention of the Navy or the fear of the people at establishing a standing naval force. George Washington summed up these fears in writing in 1778:

The other point is the jealousy, which Congress unhappily entertains of the Army, and which, if reports

²Harold Sprout and Margaret Sprout, The Rise of American Naval Power (Princeton: Princeton Univ. Press, 1942), p. 13.

³Ibid., p. 14.

⁴Jonathan Elliot (ed.), Debate on the Adoption of the Federal Constitution (5 vols.; Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott, 1896), IV, 299.

⁵Ibid.

are right, some members labour to establish. You may rest assured that there is nothing more injurious, or more unfounded. This jealousy stands upon the commonly received opinion, which under proper limitations is certainly true, that standing armies are dangerous to a State. The prejudices in other countries have only gone to them in time of peace, and these from their not having in general cases any of the ties, the concerns, or the interests of citizens, or any other dependence, than but what flowed from their military employment; in short, from their being mercenaries, hirelings. It is our policy to be prejudiced against them in time of war; though they are citizens, having all of the ties and interests of citizens, and in most cases properly totally unconnected with the military line.⁶

The policy-determining organ under the Articles of Confederation was the Continental Congress. This Congress had authority to "allow" expenditures for the common defense but had no power to levy taxes or to compel the States of the Confederacy to contribute funds to the common treasury for such expenditures. Although a standing committee of one delegate from each state was appointed to handle the general affairs of the Congress when it was not in session, and that committee was expressly empowered to build and equip a navy, it could take no steps in this direction "until nine or more of the thirteen States, in Congress assembled, should ascertain the sums and expenses necessary for the defense . . . of the United States," and "agree upon the number of vessels of war to be built or purchased" ⁷

⁶Sprout and Sprout, loc. cit.

⁷E. M. Earle (ed.), The Federalist (New York: The Modern Library, 1941), pp. 580-83.

These constitutional ambiguities were not the only obstacles. The sectional cleavages of Congress were as strong in those days as they are today. The western frontier states, though not actually states at the time, were represented by their neighboring states to the east of them due to the desires of the eastern state to be neighborly and to have a buffer between himself and the ever present Indian threat to the West. These agricultural states could see no reason for the building of a naval force but were quite interested in the creation of a standing army to protect them from the continuous Indian menace that was on their doorsteps. The maritime states desired protection of their maritime fleets, but not to the extent of creating such a large navy that would appear discourteous to any foreign naval power with whom they might trade.

Thus the Continental Congress, torn by divided counsels and incapable of replenishing its treasury in support of any naval program, endorsed the navy in principle and recommended further study of the question--which measure was soon allowed to die of inaction.

The Constitutional Convention of 1787 adopted without debate and with unanimous consent the investment of Congress with the power "to lay and collect taxes . . . to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.", as well as specifically authorizing Congress "to provide and maintain a navy." As the post

convention struggle for ratification of the new Constitution by the several states progressed, the navy clause was the subject of terrific argument, almost coinciding with the sectional, social and economic groupings of differences of opinion of the day that resulted in the two political parties, the Hamiltonian-Federalist and the Jeffersonian-Republican.⁸ This writer believes that the depredations of the Barbary Pirates upon American shipping at the same time that the state ratification conventions were in process did more to permit the passage of this section of the Constitution than any concerted effort by the proponents of a naval program. The Nation was young and was still flushed with victory over the British. Now an infidel sovereign was insultingly demanding tribute--how else could such an insult be revenged (for the present or prevented in the future) except by naval forces? Although the Constitution was finally ratified with the naval clause the blackmail of the Dey of Algiers continued; it was not until the national embarrassment reflected itself upon the Congress that any action was taken to create a national navy.

The Federalist party in power, which derived its chief support from the commercial and shipping interests along the North Atlantic seaboard and from the tidewater aristocracy of southern planters, embraced those interests who favored a Federal Navy. Although in complete control, the party resisted

⁸Charles A. Beard, The Idea of National Interest (New York: Macmillan Co., 1934), chap. II.

interior and exterior influences attempting to institute a naval program because of the extreme precariousness of the fiscal condition of the Nation's treasury. "The Confederacy had left everything connected with its finance in a state of almost inextricable confusion."⁹

On July 29, 1775, the Continental Congress resolved, That Michael Hillegas, and George Clymer, Esqrs., be and they are thereby appointed joint treasurers of the United Colonies; that the Treasurers reside in Philadelphia, and that they shall give bond, with surety, for the faithful performance of their office . . . in trust for the United Colonies.

and followed on September 25, 1775 to resolve,

That a Committee of accounts or claims be now raised to consist of one member from each of the United Colonies, to whom all accounts against the Continent are to be referred, who are to examine and report upon the same, in order for payment, seven of them to be a quorum.

and on July 30, 1776 resolved,

That all public claims and accounts that are at this time unsettled, be referred to the Committee of the Treasury and that the Committee of Claims be discharged from proceeding further upon any claims or accounts; and that all of the books and papers now in the hands of the committee of claims, be delivered to the auditor general.

and on August 6, 1776,

Mr. Clymer, one of the joint treasurers, being appointed a delegate to Congress, by the Convention of Pennsylvania. Resolved, that for the future, there be only one continental treasurer.¹⁰

⁹Sproul and Sprout, op. cit., p. 32.

¹⁰F. W. Powell, Control of Federal Expenditures; A Documentary History, 1775-1894 (Washington D. C.: The Brookings Institution, 1939), p. 3.

From the foregoing it can be seen that the legislative body of the Revolution was having the same problems of organization and re-organization that confront the Congress of today. The delegates protested the committee system of supervision of expenditures because there was no one person responsible for the committee's actions, and for the same reason reduced the number of Treasurers to one person. As the financing of the Revolution became more and more complex, a committee on Treasury Reorganization was appointed in April of 1778 and recommended on August 13, 1778 that; [spelling and capitalization follow original text]...

it appears to your Committee the following Particulars should be attended to in the Business referred to them:

1st. That no more Persons should be appointed than are necessary: Since Numbers increase the Expence, delay Business and give greater room for Corruption and the Concealment of Frauds, Indolence or Inattention.

2ndly. That there be proper Checks devised to prevent as much as possible Those who are intrusted with the Public Monies from converting it to their own Use. And those who are to examine the Public accounts from Collusion with the Creditors of the Republic, or with its Debtors.

3rdly. That Congress be enabled to see with Precision the Manner of Expenditures, and the Amount, and know the state of public Debts, and the Produce of the public Revenue.

. . . That for conducting the Affairs of the Treasury there be three principal Officers, a Comptroller, a Treasurer, and an Auditor¹¹

Thus in 1778, only three years after the initial appointment of the joint treasurers of the United States, financial reorganization was in process. Such reorganization was instituted at the express wish of the people and directed at the control of the military by means of control of the public

¹¹Ibid., p. 14.

purse, because "large accounts of the several staff departments in the army are outstanding and unsettled, . . . and it is necessary that they be speedily and finally adjusted in order that all disbursements may be clearly ascertained and arrears discharged so that public business will not suffer great prejudice therefrom. . . .¹²

The Continental Congress, having struggled mightily to create an American Navy that would be effective on a continuous basis, felt the voice of the people at the end of the war and set about to liquidate it completely. By the end of 1785 all of the ships had been sold or given away, leaving the United States, under the Articles of Confederation, with neither a navy nor a naval program. But there was left for the new Congress a definite bi-partisan attitude concerning naval affairs, as well as the debts incurred by the naval forces during the Revolution. This attitude was not affected by the lessons that should have been learned from the late war--in fact, those lessons were forgotten completely as the year ended. The people, although split on the idea of a navy or not a navy by their geographical locations and avocations, were in accord with the idea that the militia style of military machine was the only style suitable for this new democratic nation. They reasoned that this machine had won the war against superior forces and therefore would be indomitable in all future conflicts, which they were certain would never be.

¹²Ibid., p. 28.

They argued that a standing army and navy was a wasted expense and a constant danger--for a military machine has but one purpose, to fight, and its very existence invites attack as well as creates the attitude within its men and among those who support it that they are being retained for this purpose so to fulfil their destiny they will find or create a battle. During the years under President Washington the navy was not in being but the arguments for its creation continued. The act of 1789, which created the War Department, even went so far as to stipulate that the Secretary of War, under the President, should have jurisdiction over the naval forces, as well as the land forces, of the United States.¹³ General Knox, then Secretary of War, inquired into the costs of building and equipping a navy but Congress was so adamant about the subject that a bill was never presented on the floor in either House. In 1791, Thomas Jefferson, returning from France to become Secretary of State, championed a navy for the express purpose of chastising the Barbary Powers who were beleaguering American shipping in European waters. Congress still resisted these pressures because of the published opinion that the state of the Nation's finance would not permit it but basically because the majority of the people did not desire an active naval force in being.

In 1794 the European War of the French Revolution brought the matter to a head because of the damaging effect

¹³U.S., Congress, Annals of Congress, Vol. I, pp. 49, 57, 434.

that the British alliances had on the increased depredations upon American shipping. The Federalists, utilizing this effect to rally a few more votes from the Republicans, succeeded in carrying through a bill to construct and equip a naval force. This bill was the result of a great deal of political maneuvering so in its enforcement there were a great many political debts to be paid. The Treasury Department, which procured the materials of war at that time, was forced to contract for cannon from Maryland and Connecticut, ball and iron ballast from New Jersey and Pennsylvania, timber from North and South Carolina and Georgia (with crews to cut the timber recruited from Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Delaware as well as the carpenters to shape it), supplies from New London, New York and Philadelphia. There was a contract for sails from Boston and miscellaneous supplies from the other states to balance out the overall expenditures.

This distribution of the shipbuilding resources procurement was not accidental but done deliberately, in addition to the pork-barrel aspects, in order to popularize the Navy in all of the Nation's states and communities in hopes to insure legislation to continue the Navy upon a permanent basis. Although in 1796 there was a partial 'peace' established with the Dey of Algiers and it appeared that the need for the Navy was over, the administrators of these contracts had spread their subtle propaganda so well that the President was allowed to continue work on the ships already

started with the money already on hand. As the work continued and the money diminished, a skillful bit of political maneuvering was begun to obtain new monies for the final outfitting of the ships. This maneuver was doomed in the beginning but was saved in the end by the diplomatic crisis between the States and France in 1791 which stirred the people again into a warlike fervor to protect American interests on the high seas so the warship construction program was renewed.

In 1797 the Federalist party brought in John Adams as President and captured control of both houses. This complete control of the government by a navy-minded party was the real beginning of the United States Navy. Although fought at every turn by the agrarian inland factions of both parties the Federalists succeeded in passing bill after bill in support of the Navy and in the group was the one creating the Navy Department. President Adams selected a Georgetown, Maryland, Federalist and prosperous merchant by the name of George Stoddert as the first Secretary of the Navy. Adams' choice was a wise one because Stoddert was an energetic executive and a capable administrator. Serving from 1798 to 1801 he nurtured the mushroom growth of the Navy through the hostilities with France and while so doing laid a firm foundation for a sound future development of the Navy.¹⁴

Although Stoddert was party to creating a strong navy with President Adams and the Federalist party he was also

¹⁴Paullin, op. cit., p. 1001.

an accomplice in the increase of the national expenditures from six million at the beginning of the administration to eleven million at the end. This gigantic increase created consternation in Congress and even the most rabid Federalists quailed before the onslaught of public pressure opposed to the continuation of such exorbitance. The rising Jeffersonian party, comprised of the agrarian interests, urban workers and tradesmen, were represented by a congressional leader by the name of Gallatin. Gallatin was a native of Switzerland, but was now from western Pennsylvania and was^a financial genius second to none in his day, as well as an accomplished orator, politician and farmer. It was natural for President Jefferson to install his loyal supporter as Secretary of the Treasury and it was just as natural for Gallatin to pay particular attention to expenditures that were in any way connected with the Navy's growth and expansion. The Army was strongly supported by the frontier and could not be curtailed without losing support of those frontier states; therefore, as the Jeffersonian party had the platform of reduced expenditures of the Government and were opposed to naval expansion as well, the Navy was bound to suffer from their administration. Gallatin, in his office as Secretary of the Treasury, found little to commend with how the Treasury had been run in prior years and began a searching inquiry into the actual control of the expenditures of federal funds. Jefferson's message to Congress in 1802 observed that "funds appropriated

for certain purposes should be expended for those purposes" and that processes should be established to guarantee this policy and "that discretionary powers over the expenditures of public money (by the various departments of the government) should be eliminated."¹⁵ This was a direct result of the investigations of Gallatin into some expenditures made by Secretary of the Navy Stoddert wherein he had purchased ship-yards costing in excess of the amount specified in the appropriation act, utilizing funds slated for other expenditures.

As a result of Gallatin's recommendations the functions of the Accountants of the Navy Department and the War Department were reduced to those of auditors and the control of military expenditures was brought back into the Treasury Department. The Accountants, established in 1792 for the War Department and 1798 for the Navy had had much more than the present day military comptroller's control of the military purse. They drew from the Treasury the funds that were authorized by Congress for Naval and Army expenditures and then doled out these funds at the request of the Department Secretary for any purpose he desired. They answered to no audit but their own and satisfied the Treasury's rare curiosity by a running balance of mere figures showing amounts received and amounts on hand.

Here for the second time we see the military control of money being curtailed and the actual amount of money

¹⁵Powell, op. cit., p. 177.

apportioned to them reduced as the sentiments of the voters swung toward economy and liberty as the threat of war or actual war disappeared over the horizon.

Although Jefferson himself was a navy supporter and had published his ideas along that line in 1780 and had supported the passage of the Navy Act of 1794, he had become a member of a political party that was strongly anti-navy and could be expected to follow the party line. He depended upon Gallatin for more naval advice than he did his Secretary of the Navy, Robert Smith. Smith was from a maritime family long associated with shipping and commerce, but was of an easy-going nature, had little desire or capacity for leadership and yielded to the superior oratory of Gallatin and the pressure of the party. So in March 1801 the Navy was again upon the auction block for the highest bidder.

In May of 1801, Jefferson, driven by national pride to the extent to override the objections of his party, sent a small force to the Mediterranean to attempt to punish aggressions against American shipping. This force found that the ruler of Tripoli had declared war on the puny United States and began operations of war against them. Jefferson was thereby forced to retreat from his demobilization plan for the Navy in order to continue the war and the Navy was saved again.

After half-hearted legislation and costly economies the war was concluded in 1807 with the Tripolitan powers but the European war had resumed. The Jeffersonian party continued

to ignore the threat of this war and continued to cut down the naval strength. Evidently this policy was popular because it elected Federalist James Madison to the presidency who continued the policy as he came in to office in 1809, and continued it until public pressure forced the party to change its approach to the problem.

The War of 1812 was a complete fiasco from beginning to end for the Navy. Although we are reputed to have 'won' illustrious battles against the British, these skirmishes did not prevent the British from invading our Capital as well as crippling our economy with her effective blockade of our commerce. The war over, and the Nation again 'victorious' over superior forces, afforded additional proof to the supporters of the no-navy program that naval expenditures were a waste and that we could depend for our protection upon our militia navy in the future as we had in the past as well as upon our distance from all foreign powers with any aggressive tendencies. Although in 1813 the immediate effect of the cessation of the war allowed for the construction of more ships and later, at the insistence of a particularly energetic Secretary of the Navy, Benjamin Crowninshield, for the Naval Act of 1816 which called for "the gradual increase of the Navy," the end result of the War of 1812 was to almost bankrupt the Nation by the results of the British blockade which finally caused the loss of American export markets and culminated in the depression of 1821.

A particularly important effect of the war, which I believe to have been most deleterious to the well-being and future progress of the Navy, was the enhancement of the Navy Bureau autocracy within the professional naval bureaucracy. Prior to the war the Secretary had controlled the Navy with a small staff but with the increased size of the Navy and the increased funds at their disposal he had to have help in its control. The Congress, full of distrust of the military, created a Board of Commissioners comprised of three naval Captains to supervise administration and advise the Secretary, but control of policy was to remain where the Constitution placed it--in civilian hands. This was a simple decree to issue but quite difficult to enforce. The naval bureaucracy grew in numbers and solidarity. As it grew, its voice grew stronger and the problem of controlling it grew greater. The essence of this problem was how to combine the expert knowledge of this professional naval bureaucracy, the political leadership of the civilian executive, and the representative function and legislative power of Congress together in a concerted effort directed toward the betterment of the common welfare of the people.

From 1816 until 1840 the American Navy was a major issue in Congress but the anti-navy faction managed to retain the upper hand and keep the appropriations low enough to prevent even gradual growth of the Navy. President John Quincy Adams followed Monroe in 1824 but the economy-minded

Congress, fresh out of the recession of 1821, resisted naval preparedness. Andrew Jackson in his inaugural address of 1829 denounced standing armies as "dangerous to free governments in time of peace" and allowed that the Navy was less dangerous, "but the bulwark of our defense is the national militia." Jackson and his party kept down all military expenditures for his first four years in office but during the last two years of his second term, due to a rupture of diplomatic relations with France as well as the large surplus revenue pouring into the nation's Treasury, began instituting a policy of increased expenditures for naval defense. The Navy during this time had been busy in far-off places on foreign station and was little noticed by the people of the nation. They had become deeply entrenched in the Washington merry-go-round of bureaucracy and legislative procedures. Resting on their laurels of past victories they were cautious not to disturb the state of things as they were because they remembered too well the lessons of the past when their ships were laid up on the beach. They were unobtrusively performing their assigned missions while cultivating Congressmen and state officials in order to be assured of the appropriations they were presently receiving.

The administration of Van Buren and Harrison and Tyler from 1837 to 1845 was a turbulent one as far as the nation was concerned but the Naval Establishment continued without a policy of any sort for future growth along with the

nation because of the apathy of the people. Its civilian leadership and imagination, enthralled with the industrial revolution of industry and the prospects of applying some of the results of this revolution to the Navy, were resisted by both Congress and the naval professional bureaucracy. Congress resisted because it felt that the protection of the westward expansion was more important than the protection of our coastlines by any more force than we now had, and the bureaucracy resisted because they wished to maintain the status quo. The crisis of 1840-41 with the British, the suppression of the African slave trade, the annexation of Texas and the development of the now Oregon-Washington states were all important sectional issues and kept Congress occupied. The Whig party launched a successful naval program after the war scare with Britain and as a result Congress saw fit to disband the Naval Board of Commissioners and establish the Navy Department into separate bureaus without collective functions or responsibilities. This procedure was publicized as an improvement in the organization but there were some who said that the main purpose behind it was the intent to divide the now strong Navy Department into separate units that would be easier to control. 1842 saw an appropriation of over eight million dollars for the Navy alone. This appropriation was made with much furor in Congress because the sectional cleavages that were present in 1776 were still with it in even greater force. This time, however, the pork barrel entered into the picture

and distorted it beyond all reason. The spoils system or distribution of procurement which the Navy had introduced earlier in order to publicize its program now backfired and caused the most inefficient distribution of the Navy's appropriated funds as well as inefficient administration of their application.

The Democratic party rode into power in 1845 upon the platform of territorial expansion to the westward. Although the Navy did not develop itself internally during this period, its civilian executives were constantly attempting to force this development. Upon the acquisition of California there arose in the minds of the people the need for a two ocean navy and the large navy proponents in the Congress were the first to propose naval expansion. The peacefully settled Oregon disputes had awakened the dormant thoughts of the people about defense of their nation, particularly when the other navies of the world had become equipped with steam vessels and were now narrowing the great moat that we had been depending upon for protection. Steam also meant that our navy was obsolete with sail. Even if we knew that enemy fleets were steaming our way, our sailing fleet, stationed as it was in the faraway ports of the world and along our coasts, could not arrive in time to offer protection.

The nation was beginning to flex its muscles in this period because the immense industrialization and western expansion had stirred the pulse of every living American.

The Mexican War in 1846-1848, in which the Navy proved its usefulness, was a result of this stirring of 'manifest destiny' of the nation. The Treasury in 1850 had a large and increasing surplus revenue but due to the split in the Whig party over the slavery issue, the succession of Fillmore to the Presidency after the death of Taylor, left no one to lead Congress in the direction of naval expansion. As a result, Congress took the issue as a political football. It utilized the desires of the people for a strong navy to build up a spoils system that has plagued the Naval Establishment to this day. Instead of building modern steam warships that were laid down by naval architects, designed for war, it subsidized the mercantile interests by paying for the construction of steam merchant ships, which they said "could be converted in case of war." Although naval engineers had pioneered the development of the screw propeller, improved upon the ordnance systems, and had requested that industry be allowed to produce armor plate for ships of war, Congress gave them only token respect for their ideas. The additional navy yards that were built for specific Congressmen could have paid for a new fleet and the yards were only in business because the present fleet was so old that each repair was almost like new construction.

In 1852 the Democrats recaptured the Presidency from the Whigs and began a strong naval program with the almost unanimous consent of the people. Commodore Perry opened the ports of Japan in 1854 and Secretary of the Navy Dobbin

utilized this favorable publicity to give additional impetus to his aggressive leadership of the naval expansion and modernization program. The naval bureaucracy dawdled along behind the Secretary, however, and did not support him with a vigorous plan of execution. The ships that they wanted were no more than sailing vessels with auxillary engines. They neglected completely the lessons of the past wars and based their requirements upon shallow draft vessels for coastal defense. They failed to observe the complete change in the fleets of the foreign nations--who were all equipped with armored and steel, steam powered, ocean-going men-of-war that could out-steam and outgun any of our ships afloat. Of course it must be remembered that the Navy was playing at politics at the time and could obtain all of the support it wanted from the strong Southern bloc in support of the shallow draft vessels program where they could depend upon no one particular group for support of the large armored ship programs. Each attempt of Congress to obtain money for naval construction of ships for the open sea brought up the question of whether these ships would be used to suppress the slave trade and the anti-navy, anti-slavery Senators joined forces with the Southern bloc to defeat the bill because they felt that the slave trade issue was being used to cloak the real intent of creation of a super ocean-going navy.

CHAPTER II

GROWTH

The period just prior to the Civil War and during it had all indications of being the beginning of the awakening of the American people to the mandatory requirements of a modern navy, but such was not the case. Although the iron-clad, steam powered, floating fort, the Merrimac, in its popular battle with the Monitor would appear to force the issue, the expense of the war was so great that no party or faction supported any naval program. The lessons again were that our policies of coastal defense and commerce raiding contributed but little to the war effort, but these lessons were hastily forgotten in the internal rebuilding of the country's economy. The American Navy went back to sail to save money and the wooden vessels stored on the ways rotted away for lack of upkeep. Politics, graft and corruption ate away at the heart of the Naval Establishment and a bitter struggle between the bureau heads for survival reigned. The Line Navy thwarted the attempts of the civil Secretaries to bring order out of this chaos and the House and Senate Naval Affairs Committees had little to offer in the way of a constructive legislative program. So, as before, after the war

the Navy was no longer required and was allowed to sink into a state of desuetude due to the disinterest of the people of the United States, a mistake that would cost them millions to repair in the future.

In 1881 the Republican party came into power with General Garfield as President and, for the first time in six years, the presidential party was the party in control of both houses of Congress. The Secretary of State, James G. Blaine, was a strong representative of the union of strong nationalism and resurgent mercantilism that was forcing the American nation into the hurly-burly of international politics. The American public was interested in the islands of the Pacific, the Far East, the isthmian canal in Panama and was vocal in its demands for a navy to enforce its interests. The House Naval Affairs Committee was stirred into action as a result and the naval bureaucracy was eager this time to aid whoever was willing to espouse its cause. Garfield chose a southerner from Louisiana, W. H. Hunt, for his Secretary of Navy and luckily happened upon a man that was interested and well informed about the Navy. Garfield's interest was to obtain a man from the South for representation in his Cabinet as a matter of party doctrine but for one year at least the Navy was controlled by a man that drew on the professional advice, presented sound naval plans and programs to Congress for action and created the first Navy-Congress informal discussion group to iron out the problems of each group prior to legislative

proceedings. The assassination of Garfield disrupted this excellent beginning of the Navy's resurgence but President Arthur strongly endorsed Hunt's program and instructed his Secretary of the Navy, W. E. Chandler, from New Hampshire, to carry on in the same manner. Chandler had an abundance of energy, a good sense of organization and a strong interest in naval reconstruction. Although his administration was criticized for some political pork-barrelling in the issuance of ship-building contracts, he did give great service to the Navy in pushing through the rebuilding of the Navy in face of great technical and political difficulties. Here is the first example of the Navy being protected from the politicking of the legislative groups by their civil Secretary.

Neither President Cleveland nor his Secretary of the Navy, W. C. Whitney, were overly enthusiastic about the naval programs but because of their financial and geographic (eastern seaboard) backgrounds were in favor of a general strong navy policy. Party feeling was strong in the latter part of the nineteenth century and party policy was the guideline for any politician no matter what his stature. The Republicans were affiliated with industrialism and were for larger and more rapid reconstruction of the Navy while the Democrats were in favor of a small navy concept. Neither party, however, would yield to the other on any bit of legislation even if the opponent were espousing a program identical with their platform. A Democratic President dealing with a

Republican (big navy) Congress would still find it difficult to effect a program favoring a big navy. Patronage, favoritism and the spoils system in general made for much confusion and waste as well. Chandler (under President Arthur) attempted to sidetrack this system by awarding contracts for naval vessels to private yards rather than to the political, graft ridden naval yards but he, too, was playing favorites with industry.

The internal administration of the Navy was at fault at this time as well. Each bureau was independent and struggling against the other for its share of the appropriation dollar and the Secretary, overburdened with the administrative detail and political ramifications of his very large organization did not have the administrative or legal power to bring the bureaus into line. Whitney was the first Secretary to bring the Navy and Congress together and now we find that he began the process of bringing the Navy's own bureaus into cooperation with each other.

The Navy was still split on the conversion to steam issue, the use of armored, wood or steel ships and disagreed upon the basic policy of coastal defense-commerce raider type operations or control of the seas. With the professional sailor so much at sea and the legislative body still split on the same policy and the large-small navy split between parties, it is a wonder that any progress was made at all during this period.

Cleveland's second term Secretary of Navy, H. A. Herbert of Alabama, was inspired, as was most of the world, by Captain A. T. Mahan and his strong command at sea, capital-ship theory of naval defense of the Western Hemisphere. Mahan was a career naval officer of no particular renown when he was assigned to the newly created Naval War College as an instructor. Relaxing from the strenuous life at sea, Mahan had time to compile his theories in book form, bringing out two related philosophies, the theory of national prosperity and destiny founded upon a program of mercantilistic imperialism and the other a pure and simple theory of naval strategy and defense. Although the recession of 1893 held back Herbert's aggressive campaign and his campaign was somewhat at odds with the small navy platform of the Democratic party, the Sino-Japanese War battleship sea battles, the Venezuelan boundary crisis with Great Britain and the Cuban crisis with Spain joined forces to impress the people of the necessity of maintaining a navy somewhat comparable to the other navies of the world.

The Democratic administration of Cleveland began the capital ship expansion program of the Navy but it remained for the Republican party to continue it to its completion. In 1897 the Republicans came into power with William McKinley and a weak platform of continued enlargement of the Navy that had been casually slipped into the background due to the party's difficulty with the agrarian Democratic contest for the

election. The Secretary of Navy, J. D. Long from Massachusetts, was equally passive about the navy expansion as was the Chief of the Navy Bureau of Navigation, Admiral A. S. Crowninshield, his chief advisor on personnel and technical matters. McKinley would have had a peaceful office if he had not been politically maneuvered into selecting Theodore Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the Navy.

Roosevelt was an ardent disciple of Mahan and a militant nationalist. He took charge of the Navy Department in every way and worked night and day building up the Navy with the funds on hand and inveigling the Congress and the people into accepting his views upon national power and policy. Taking advantage of Secretary Long's absence from his office for a few hours shortly after the unexplained explosion aboard the battleship Maine in Havana harbor, Roosevelt placed the Navy on a full war footing. Although this high-handed action did not start the Spanish American War immediately it did create considerable thought toward the subject and gave additional impetus to naval planning for such a war.

In late 1897 Roosevelt sent Commodore Dewey on a tour of the Pacific to assemble and train the fleet for an attack upon the Spanish possessions in the Pacific should war commence. When war was declared in April of 1898, Dewey was well trained and prepared to enter and conquer Manila and to scuttle the Spanish Pacific Fleet in one short battle that was a complete rout. Roosevelt could not control the strategic or

tactical maneuvering of the Atlantic Fleet; it was too close to Washington and was commanded by old Line Admirals who had little respect for this upstart of an Assistant Secretary. While the command vacillated and its directives conflicted on the problem of what to do about the Spanish fleet, the population of the Atlantic seaboard became panic-stricken at the rumors that the enemy fleet was about to ravage their shores. Congress arose again to call for coastal defense by the naval forces and the day was almost lost for the Navy but for the timely location of the enemy fleet in the harbor of Santiago where they were blockaded and finally forced to sea and ultimate destruction. Although the nation had forcibly entered into the international scene by her acts in this war she continued to resist the pressures to equip a navy comparable to her international stature. She had obtained coaling stations throughout the Pacific, had firm bases and fleet stations in the Carribean, yet was reluctant to commit herself to the costly maintenance of a fleet in being.

The popularity of Theodore Roosevelt forced his party to couple him with McKinley in order to assure retention of the party's seat in the White House. This attempt to bury this active Navy supporter boomeranged on the party with McKinley's death and the Navy was again on the way to complete reconstruction. With Roosevelt the Mahan policy of strong mercantilism and command of the seas entered the executive department of the United States. Under his tutelage the manifest destiny feeling

arose in the hearts of the American people, and coupled with this feeling was the rebirth of the desire for a large Navy. Roosevelt utilized every stratagem of political maneuvering possible to wheedle the last red cent out of Congress for the re-creation of this new Navy, and Congress was forced to accede to his demands because of the pressures that they felt from the people; a result of his skillful propagandizing in support of a strong Navy policy. Here we see another instance of the civil leadership exerting political pressure beyond the capability or responsibility of the military professional in order to install the recommendations of its technical military advisers.

Several years of timid and cautious political leadership had tightened the hold of the Navy Department bureaucracy, which now ruled with an iron hand, usually ignoring and sometimes penalizing those within the structure who attempted to introduce reforms and innovations. Congress was more interested in Navy spoils than in naval efficiency and with the lay public apathetic as ever to the details of naval art and science and with cautious and elderly officers staffing the Navy resisting change, Congress was able to continue its log-rolling utilization of naval appropriations. The President was unable to conquer Congress' navy yard policy but used it to gain more capital ships for the Navy. Roosevelt's tenure of office was far from peaceful in its relationships with the legislative body but he managed to gain the greatest advances

for the Navy of any prior or succeeding President simply because he maintained constant executive political leadership in this program.

President Taft and his Secretary of the Navy G. L. Meyer, inherited from Roosevelt a resisting Congress, a depression, and a Treasury deficit. Coupling this with their own political leadership weaknesses, they could do little to maintain the rate of advance of the Navy cause that Roosevelt had established, but they did manage to improve the Navy within itself in administration, efficiency and morale.

The apathy of the public was too great to conquer and on the surge of pacifism that was sweeping the country, Wilson rode into the White House with Democratic parties in control of both branches of Congress. The Democratic party was a moderate navy party and even though the people were resistant to any naval increase or even the continuation of the Navy at its present size and cost, the party quietly went along with a modified Rooseveltian naval scheme. President Wilson brought in Josephus Daniels from North Carolina to be his Secretary of the Navy. Daniels had supported the Taft naval program and now felt that the Navy of the United States should be continued along a "golden mean" between a large and small navy. Daniels worked for industrialization of the naval yards, commercializing of the naval procurement problems, elimination of inefficiencies of administration and operation of the Naval Establishment and for the developing of the Navy into a "great university" for its officers and men.

It should be remembered that during this period submarines were introduced to the Navy, and although costly, were accepted wholeheartedly by Congress and the people because they were to be utilized in coastal defense, a cause still dear to the hearts of the legislators and the people since the Revolutionary War. As well at the time came the innovation of the naval form of the general staff to advise and thus ease the burden of the Secretary of Navy in his control of the Navy. The original plan called for a Chief of Naval Operations who, with fifteen assistants, would be "responsible for the readiness of the Navy for War and be charged with its general direction"¹⁶ but as finally enacted, the clause provided for a Chief, without any assistants, "who shall, under the direction of the Secretary of the Navy, be charged with the operations of the Fleet, and with preparation and readiness of plans for its use in war." Evidently the Administration, the party or legislators or both, were unwilling to strengthen the professional influence in the Navy Department.

To counteract the pacifism that had again swept the country a campaign of war propaganda was instituted by the ardent nationalists of the period. This campaign was so intense that the Naval Act of 1916, a naval program without precedent in the entire world either in terms of money or ships, was passed with only fifty-one negative votes and ninety-nine members not voting. This non-voting group was hesitant

¹⁶U.S., Congressional Record, 63d Cong., 3d Sess., 1915, LII, Part 3, 2747-48.

to place on record their previously voiced objections to the bill for fear of the vilification that would be rained down upon them for their lack of patriotism. Included in the three hundred million dollar bill was the increased rank of Admiral for the Chief of Naval Operations, the development of a naval aviation corps and sums for its development and the establishment of a procedure for the President to call a conference to follow the end of the war to formulate "a plan for a court of arbitration" and "to consider the question of disarmament."¹⁷ Thus for the first time in our history we have the complete mergence of naval policy and foreign policy of the United States.

The lessons learned in World War I were, like the lessons learned in all previous wars conducted by our nation, immediately forgotten in the haste of the American public to return to and enjoy those liberties that they had relinquished in order to wage a successful battle against their enemies. The Congress and the executive department, reflecting the desires of the people, began to economize in all fields of military activity and even though knowing that such economies were false and misleading and would only result in terrific expenses for the future generations to rectify these errors, continued to attempt to answer the demands of the people and save the economy of the nation for those future generations by retaining as much of the military machine intact as possible.

¹⁷U.S., Congressional Record, 64th Cong., 1st Sess., 1916, LIII, Part II, 10922-12800.

The disarmament programs of the twenties could only be followed by the armament program of 1938 and a following increase in 1939, all leading to the nation's future participation in the truly World War of 1933-45, a war that was to tax the economy of our nation to its utmost, and change the isolationist and neutral attitude of the American people to one of increased awareness of their global responsibilities. This feeling was apparent in the thirties for Newton Baker stated in 1935:

Complete economic isolation is impossible, and as the United States has become one of the greater creditor nations of the world, the financial arrangements which will render the interchange of commodities between us and other people possible are a matter of primary and continuing concern to us. Such financial arrangements mean financial and economic stability in all parts of the world with which we must trade or where it is to our advantage to trade. From this it results that our own economic well being urges us to an interest in every thing which can foster the growth of international relations generally of a character to make peaceful and profitable commerce possible.¹⁸

When the state of 'international relations became generally of a nature to make peaceful and profitable commerce' impossible, the nation began to exert political and economic pressure upon the international scene, and as these means failed, measures approaching war were attempted but these failed as well, World War II was the ultimate result.

With World War II, the Navy had another Roosevelt to champion its cause. The appropriation acts of 1938 began the expansion of the Navy that was to become during the course of the war the largest and most expensive naval machine yet known

¹⁸Newton D. Baker, War in the Modern World (Boston: Mifflin Co., 1935), p. 55.

by the world. By the time of the actual outbreak of the global war the entire people of the United States had begun to realize their responsibilities toward the rest of the world. The same air of pacifism and isolationism that crossed the country prior to World War I was felt in less magnitude. The political leaders of the nation led the military in its expansion and convinced the majority of the civilian populace that this was the correct action to take. The spoils system of military procurement was partially eliminated but because of the very great amount of military expenditures there were not controls available to prevent favoritism in some of the contracts issued. As the nation geared itself to almost total war, the problem of whether the military controlled itself and the nation or was controlled by the civil service political-appointee was almost undefinable, for which was civilian and which was military?

The positions of operational military control of the Navy were combined early in the war, the Commander in Chief of the United States Fleet was returned to the nerve center of the war, Washington, and later combined with the position of Chief of Naval Operations. He was ordered as "principle naval advisor to the President and the Secretary of the Navy" and to "have command of the operating forces with coordination and direction of effort of the bureaus and offices." To counter this strength of the military leader of the Navy the Secretary was given assistant secretaries and retained control over

procurement, contracting and production of material and naval research, test, experimental and development activities. This organization weathered the end of the war but due to its obvious shortcomings and the changed attitudes of the people it was due for another overhauling after the war hysteria had passed. The reorganizations of the military administration following World War II were the most intensive yet attempted by the American legislators. The cost of the military machine had become so great and the need for the machine had become so necessary in the minds of the American people that they were forced to act and act judiciously. The world had become compressed, our shores were now the shores of all nations and the coastal defense-mercantile raider naval program had disappeared from the minds of the people.

In 1942, under the exigencies of war, the traditional system of decentralization and independent authority which had prevailed in the navy for a full century was finally modified into an approximation of the centralized control under a chief of staff which had long been advocated. Thus, under the pressures of war and a continuing security crisis, the President was led to adopt for the navy an administrative system in which the need for military adequacy was given priority over the fears for civil control which had for so long blocked the step. . . Regardless of the appeal the old order of things might have had for democratic leadership in the Congress and the White House, the new dimensions in the national security problem had made major change necessary. . . The old policy of safeguarding civil supremacy by "calculated dispersion" had to be laid aside for a new policy which would give the departmental unity and military energy requisite for the new situation faced by the United States at midcentury."¹⁹

¹⁹Louis Smith, American Democracy and Military Power (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1951), p. 156.

CHAPTER III

MATURITY AND POST WORLD WAR II

The demobilization of the world's largest war machine, the Armed Forces of the United States, at the conclusion of the war with Japan was accomplished much quicker than anyone had foreseen. Pressure was placed upon the nation to demobilize its forces by foreign external sources, the legislators of the nation in response to the appeals of its constituencies, the judicial, the executive and from within the military itself. The Republican victory in the 1946 Congressional elections seemed to assure a non-military future for the nation as had previous ante bellum party victories. But before the war machine had collapsed completely came the ideological post-war conflicts with the Soviet Union. The people of the United States, retaining fresh in their memories their own individual participation in that war, were of one voice in their desire to retain peace through the medium of strength. Because of this attitude the 'cold war' launched by the Soviet placed the American people in the mental attitude of an actual physical war. Military policy and political legislation followed this attitude and established a strong military force in order that the liberties of the nation might be secure from

Russian expansion. The foreign policy adopted reflected in the maintenance of large armies of occupation in Germany and Japan, and the continuance of strong naval and air bases scattered throughout the world at strategic locations.

To support this strong military policy approximately one-third of the total Federal Budget, about twelve billion dollars, was appropriated directly for the Army and Navy in 1947. This vast expenditure capability naturally gave the military forces increasing influence in legislative affairs and soon top military men moved into the once civilian-held positions, not only of influence but of actual authority, within the administration structure. Admiral William D. Leahy stayed on at the White House as President Truman's personal military advisor or private chief of staff. General Marshall replaced Jimmy Byrnes as Secretary of State, and inevitably the department itself came more and more under military control. Abroad in overseas diplomatic posts General W. B. Smith was Ambassador to Russia, General Lucius Clay was High Commissioner for Germany and General Douglas MacArthur High Commissioner for Japan, all giving a very militaristic cast to our post-war international policies. At home the establishment of the National Security Council and the unification of the Armed Forces into a single department enabled the Secretary of National Defense to work in very close coordination with the Secretary of State in determining all foreign policy.²⁰

²⁰Herbert Croly, "The Effect on American Institutions of a Powerful Military and Naval Establishment," Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, LXVI (July, 1916) 157-72.

This practical integration of military and diplomatic policies was more evidence of the continued acceptance of the doctrine of peace through strength. Following the acceptance of this continued trend there could but follow the centralization of all authority, military control over the national economy and ultimately the complete conscription of manpower with which to feed the ever-hungry maw of military might. With the passage of the National Security Act of 1947, which unified the Armed Services under one Secretary of Defense and created the National Security Council, came the first active effort of the legislature to halt the increasing onrush of the nation toward a garrison state.²¹ Resistance on the part of industry as well as the legislators was all that prevented military control of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission, the controlling authority of the strongest weapon of war yet devised by man, the utilization of which for peaceful purposes at this writing appears to be the dawn of a new age of the world. The civilian and military Special Boards established under the act were given broad authority and ample funds to direct scientific research and allocate industrial production along military lines. This direction of research and industry was thought at first to be most favorable to the progress of the military into absolute control but has now, after the 1949 amendments, proven to be a most effective deterrent to the military in their aggressive onslaught into the fields of administrative control. These

²¹National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., July 26, 1947, in U.S. Statutes at Large, LXI, Part 1, Chap. 343, 495-510.

special civilian staffed boards comprised the major buffer to their demands yet provided sufficient materials for their requirements.

The military mind also invaded the field of American culture in such things as the GI education bill, the expansion of the R.O.T.C collegiate training programs by all three of the services, the granting of scientific research programs to universities and the entry into the educational fields of such outstanding military men as our present President of the United States, then President of Columbia University, General Dwight D. Eisenhower, all did their part to contribute to the dominance of the military.

Underlying these specific instances of military supremacy in civilian fields, and an even more insidious threat to civil control, was the steadily growing military ability to directly influence both the public and the legislative bodies of the nation. Stimulated by the continuous crisis-to-crisis existence pervading the Washington political arena, the military expert, the professional with his brilliant war record and intimate knowledge of all nations of the world, impressed the Congressman out of all proportion to the factual truths of his observations. The Congressman, with his ear to the public's sympathies toward a peace through strength program, listened only to justify his vote, not to clarify it. As the prestige of the military grew they began to flex their new muscles, instituted lobby units and allocated large amounts to be spent

in the area of 'public relations', competing with each other and propagandizing their own causes under the guise of informing the public of what they should know about the world and the United States.

This struggle to capture the public's sympathies became most obvious in the presentations by the military for the enactment of a conscription bill, commonly called Universal Military Training. The U.M.T. squabble had its ups and downs for each side; victory for the civilian in May 1948 when the wartime law was allowed to expire without extension, but followed a month later by defeat when Congress passed a new Selective Service Act.

The Act provided that the Secretary of Defense is the "principal assistant to the President in all matters pertaining to the Department of Defense."²² Therefore he is established as the Deputy Commander in Chief with Presidential power in all military matters. There is not one aspect of the Department of Defense that is beyond his authority and direction. He is charged with the constitutional and traditional duty of exercising civilian control of the Armed Forces in all matters. Now, more than ever before, this duty is of prime importance, and requires an individual of the greatest discernment to discharge these responsibilities to the greatest benefit to the nation. The Armed Forces' internal divisions of opinion must be decided by the Secretary of Defense; these questions

²²Townsend Hoopes, "Civilian Military Balance," Yale Review, XLII (Winter, 1954), 220-25.

ofttimes arising out of problems that divide the Joint Chiefs of Staff necessitating decisions by the Secretary in order that the National Security Council may formulate the national strategy to give to the Joint Chiefs so that they may develop their military plans to support it. Within this interlocking decision-making process the Secretary of Defense must play as a prejudiced judge, prejudiced in favor of the decision that will be of most benefit to the American people and not necessarily to any particular one of the services which he controls. In fact, the majority of his difficult decisions arise from differences of the opinion of the military bodies as to the professional military merits of the case at hand and how to solve the problem from the air-army-navy professional military viewpoint, individual and separate and oftentimes so diverse as to be extreme opposite ideas.

In April 1953, President Eisenhower laid the confusion at issue directly before the Congress when he said "Basic decisions relating to the military forces must be made by politically accountable civilian officials. Conversely, professional military leaders must not be thrust into the political arena to become prey of partisan politics."²³ This letter and the accompanying reorganization plan heralded a significant change in policy for the military bureaucracy. Here the President himself had come to the people through the Congress in order to reestablish the civilian-military balance

²³Hoopes, loc. cit.

into its rightful proportions. This balance of professional military advice and ultimate civilian responsibility in the formulation and execution of foreign-military policy, or national policy, is the problem which confronts the Secretary of Defense throughout his tenure of office. The balance had shifted to the military so the President was forced to come to the rescue of the civilian Secretary and restore the balance by legislative action through the cooperation of Congress.

This confusion of control stemmed from the original National Security Act of 1947 wherein the Joint Chiefs of Staff were given their statutory powers. They rapidly assumed a semi-autonomous control upon receiving these powers; they planned and directed national policy, and, as the importance of the military increased with the Korean War and the continuous 'cold war' of the Soviet Republics, the power of the civilian Secretaries decreased in proportion. The Joint Chiefs of Staff assumed that they were separate from their services and their service Secretaries and were only responsible for the military advice they were to give to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The development of their corporate military judgments prevented their service Secretaries from any participation in the planning of policy and forestalled their attempts and abilities to question and analyze the decisions. Hiding behind their solid front, the Joint Chiefs allowed the bitter inter-service rivalries to flourish anew without responsibility and with some degree of assistance from their

procedures. The Joint Chiefs placed additional obstacles in the way of civilian control by their effective delegation of control of the gigantic overseas activities of the military. In accordance with the Key West Agreement of 1948 the world theatres were distributed to each of the three services for control as executive agents of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and as the Joint Chiefs of Staff controlled the communications to these executive agents, they were in absolute control.

The President, in his Reorganization Plan No. 6,²⁴ strengthened civilian responsibility and improved the machinery of strategic planning. He asserted the plenary powers of the Secretary of Defense by stating:

No function in any part of the Department of Defense or in any of its component agencies should be performed independent of the direction, authority, and control of the Secretary of Defense. The Secretary is the accountable civilian head of the Department of Defense and under law, my principle assistant in all matters relating to the department. I want all to know that he has my full backing in that role.

In addition, the plan eliminated the Munitions Board and the Research and Development Board and provided that these functions shall be redistributed among five additional assistant Secretaries of Defense (the sixth to handle legislative and administrative affairs). The Key West Agreement was changed to place the Secretary of Defense in the action position of designating the areas to be controlled by which service, therefore reaffirming the position of the Secretary in the

²⁴Ibid.

chain of command; President, Secretary of Defense, service Secretary to military service. The President thereby eliminated the Joint Chiefs as a contestant for control and placed them back in their original position of being his military advisors. To continue, his letter regarding the reorganization went on to say more about strategic planning and the functions of civil control, "Our military plans are based primarily on military factors but they must also take into consideration a wider range of policy and economic factors as well as the latest developments of modern science."

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible to the President for managing the Staff and its several subcommittees, and is responsible for the fullest cooperation between the Staff substructure and the other parts of the office of the Secretary of Defense in the early stages of staff work on any major problem. Relegated to its proper position in the chain of command in the Defense structure, the Joint Chiefs of Staff now become the most important link in the chain which holds the military, economic and political policies of the nation together in a combined and fully supported national policy. This reorganization of the executive department in 1953 gave the civilian balance of power the weight it needed to return to its rightful position as the controller of the Armed Forces. It brought the civilian Secretaries back to their position of authority and responsibility and placed them and the several Assistant Secretaries of Defense and other

civilian experts back in the field of military planning; gave the Secretary of Defense effective authority not only to establish unified command but also to exercise strategic command.

The reorganization and the resumption of civilian control accentuated civilian responsibility for basic decisions relating to the Armed Forces. It was not a new responsibility but rather the reassertion of an old one that was rapidly being obscured by the growth of military influence and responsibility in the national life of these United States as well as the legislative, executive and judicial arguments that had arisen in the bitter and continuing struggle to bring the nation's Armed Forces under a central authority.

There are other ways that will help Congress and the people to preserve their control. One is a careful prescription of the powers of the principal military officers. Another lies, of course, in the power of making or withholding appropriations: in the past this power has been exercised too rigidly at some times and too loosely at others. A most important means of control is the reserved right to confirm or forbid appointments. The most effective of all would be an insistence that the Secretary of War be a capable civilian who will devote his entire talent and time to the duties of his office.²⁵

Existing law grants the now elaborated powers to the Secretary of Defense and his three service secretaries; this reorganization was merely an action to shift the emphasis of authority and responsibility back to the accountable civilian officials where it belonged. In 1947, when the act was originated, and in 1949, when it was amended, these wasted years of service

²⁵Alvin Brown, The Armor of Organization (New York: Hiffert Printinting Co., 1953), p. 298.

strife, 1949 to 1953, could have been prevented could they have been foreseen but it was not remotely suspected at that time by the executive department that the cold war would reach the intensity it has; that Korea would occur and that the military would assert its power to the extent that the civilian officials would yield so much of their effective power to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. "And by their hesitance and deference to military opinion, admit the claim that only professional military men could formulate military policy."²⁶ The year 1950 was a momentous one for the Naval Establishment. In the beginning of the year the political idea was that the Navy was too large for the economy of the nation and once again it was placed on the auction block. Four years of cold war had dulled the nation's senses and lulled it into a false sense of security. Once again the aggressive tactics of a foreign power saved the Navy from complete liquidation. The Communist sponsored invasion of South Korea by the North Korean troops in June of 1950 presaged three years of war and truce negotiations. The conduct of that war showed again the necessity for command of the seas and silenced the argument that command of the air was sufficient to maintain control, not without bringing the basic truth out that wars are won by command of the ground. Governmental and Defense spending reached an all-time high during this short brush fire type of conflict and the Defense Department, as reorganized, received a complete

²⁶Hoopes, loc. cit.

examination upon the efficiencies of that reorganization. Upon the introduction of truce talks the Republican Party, upon an ante bellum wave of popularity, placed General D. D. Eisenhower in the White House. Eisenhower's platform was based upon ending the war in Korea and placing the government upon a more sound economic basis. The war in Korea was ended but the Federal spending continued, mainly because the demands of the military on the Federal Treasury had increased because of increased mechanization of war and the resultant increases in the cost of maintaining a defense force equipped with modern mechanized equipment.

President Eisenhower, after testing the organization of the Department of Defense by observation of its workings, felt that it needed additional reorganization in order to control the ever-increasing costs of its operation. In April of 1958 he presented a 7000 word letter to Congress stating his views. Congress at the same time had been feeling out the grass roots of their constituencies and was of the same opinion but had planned a somewhat different attack upon the problem. The situation at present is in a stalemate but from the military point of view, there will be a definite reorganization of scalar lines of authority within the Department because the President is empowered to do so by administrative processes. Eisenhower is not a Theodore or Franklin Roosevelt. He does not have the Congress in the palm of his hand nor does he have the people listening to his voice. His program will

in all probability become effective only because the legislators are generally in accord with the basic promises of the program as he states:

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our overall objectives.

2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to unified commands from the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense.

3. We must strengthen the staff of the office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.

4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.

5. We must reorganize the research and development functions of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.

6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.²⁷

This suggested reorganization stresses unified commands and the control of those commands by the Secretary of Defense, relegating the Service Secretaries to responsibilities of other than operational military nature. The President amplified his points presented above particularly in respect to the administration of funds by the Secretary of Defense. He states:

I strongly urge that in the future the Congress make appropriations for this Department in such a nature as to provide the Secretary of Defense adequate authority and flexibility to discharge his heavy responsibilities.

The President is therefore requesting that Congress authorize

²⁷"The President's Message to Congress on Reorganization," The Washington Post and Times Herald, April 4, 1958, p. A-6.

money to the Secretary of Defense for all military purposes rather than to the individual services separately. Congress will not yield this power of fund control over the services, for in it lies the only absolute control of the military that resides in the legislature, and the only immediate way in which the voice of the people can be immediately acknowledged by the legislators. Each Department of the government would like to have absolute authority over the expenditure of funds authorized but since the beginning of this nation Congress has tenaciously retained its absolute power of the purse.

The first three items on the program are attempts on the part of the President to decentralize the overwhelmingly large organization that the Defense Department has become. The National Security Act as amended unifies and standardizes the procedures and policies of the Department. In effecting this unification and standardization there was a definite tendency on all concerned to centralize authority, a tendency that led to the creation of too large a problem for any one man or one staff to control. The present unified command emphasis is an attempt to separate the Department into units with common programs, containing the similar parts of all the separate services, all directed in a concerted effort to a common goal in charge of a commander from any service. This is similar to the situation in industry where, although the subsidiaries and branches of a company follow the same business procedures and policies their products are different and their

profits are a result of their own management skill. They are controlled by the Board of Directors of the parent company and answer to them for their gross errors but absorb their own losses into their own gains.

This decentralization is not appreciated by Congress for they feel that it will decentralize responsibility and there will be no one person or group available for censure or commendation. They cannot appreciate the fact that the Defense Department has grown to a size beyond their control and are very hesitant about attempting any changes in the historical processes now in effect. They fear too the creation of an office, manned by a political appointee, that would have such great spending power as would the Secretary of Defense. As it now stands they feel that they can control the spending habits of the three separate Secretaries and have installed sufficient mechanical controls to aid in this direction. To have all of the forty billion dollars under the control of one man, as they see it, would create a situation that would be dangerous to the liberties of the people of the nation. Their policy in this respect is still the same policy of the First Congress; founded upon the distrust of the military and because of this distrust utilizing every power possible to prevent the military from the assumption of absolute control.

Within the military organization itself this program will call for some drastic changes in concepts and approaches to mutual problems by the military leaders. Senior military

officers are no longer only marksmen, pilots or shiphandlers. They are to be competent and well trained managers of large, complex and diverse organizations. They shall be required to have a broad military, political and commercial background to fulfill this requirement. Their single service loyalties must be diverted to a national loyalty at an early stage of their careers in order that they might develop into a niche of this new concept.

The staff of the Secretary of Defense, like the Board of Directors of a large corporation, must consist of the best military and civilian talent available, well experienced in all fields of military and civilian endeavors. If Congress will recognize the essentiality of this decentralization and content itself with measures of results rather than insisting upon uniform procedures, detailed financial reporting, and consultation upon operational decisions, this staff can utilize the unified commands and separate departments of the services as adequate loci of control and keep the size of the staff to a minimum.

CHAPTER IV

CONCLUSIONS

In a democracy, business interests and individual freedom ought to predominate, and military groups, by their very nature, threaten business interests, individual freedoms and the general welfare.

In point of fact, civilian supremacy is never in abeyance under the American form of government; the civil authority does not abdicate in time of war or any other crisis. Indeed it is precisely in time of war--when great decisions must be reached involving the issue of survival, the scope of hostilities, and the form of peace settlement--that the civil authority must most vigorously assert its supremacy. A president having confidence in his military commanders will normally refrain from interference in their conduct of purely military operations. But he and his Secretary of Defense will most assuredly exercise control over those military matters that contain broad political implications and consequences. They have the clearest authority and obligation to do so.²⁸

Therefore, except during actual combat, the suppression and repression of military institutions by whatever means necessary and possible and available is justified. "Creeping militarism"²⁹ is not militarism in the designed state like that on the Prussian order; it is an unanticipated militarism that slowly and insidiously develops from the lack of effective traditions and practices for controlling the military

²⁸Hoopes, op. cit., p. 223.

²⁹H. D. Lasswell, National Security and Individual Freedom (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1950), passim.

establishment; the isolation between the civil and military leadership and the failure of the civil servant and the legislator to act relevantly and consistently. As a result the extension of the tasks and powers of the military is encouraged and stimulated by such shortcomings.

The top military leaders of the military are not all affected in the same manner nor do they all react in the same manner to this stimulus. These members who have risen to flag rank because of their outstanding performances in the operational and technical field are conforming to the age-old premise of step by step accession to command by the command of men in battle. They are the ideal professional soldier, devoted to country and to organization, a passive technical civil servant who can be indoctrinated and made accountable for only the military consequences of his actions. It is the smaller group of the top military leaders who might be considered the absolute leaders of the military, who have strengthened and enlarged the field of this creeping militarism. Military institutions are being civilianised in all respects so why should not there arise a military-politician group such as this? The nation has insisted on modern management, budgeting, statistical control, conference procedures, auditing and the human relations approach in the military as is applied in modern industry. We now see the old-time limited perspective, isolated and aloof, professional military man being supplanted by the more informed, gregarious and socially

acceptable individual professional technician. The increased technical aspects of military training and future employment in war has placed the emphasis upon initiative rather than the strict enforcement of discipline; highly skilled men require high motivation that must be nurtured and nourished by skillful leadership; a definite departure from the cherished traditions of military spit and polish discipline. Thus social relations, personal leadership, material benefits, ideological indoctrinations and the justice and meaningfulness of the war aims of the nation are all component parts of the morale of the military and the major concern of the top military commanders. In order to have these men in top command, the military has completely renovated their graduate and undergraduate school systems to produce the desired result and in that result have realized the final product as a political-militarist, a top level military leader, well schooled in the basic humanities and experienced in the fields of civilian political affairs, flexible, persuasive and a master at the gentle art of manipulation, still loyal to his country and his organization but willingly devoted to the advancement of the military causes. They are staff artists, blighted only slightly by the exposure to command of operational forces. Public relations in the field of mass persuasion and mass manipulation techniques are their forte and lead them irrevocably into the field of active political maneuvering while adroitly operating under the guise of developing public support for military establishment policies.

This activity is oftentimes thinly disguised by the statement that they are only attempting to inform the public and not attempting to lead or direct their sympathies in any direction: "An informed nation is a strong nation" conceptual approach.³⁰ Given the new international responsibilities of the United States and the probabilities of protracted world tensions, the problem of the proper relationship of the civilian executive and the military head will continue to require the attention of the American people for many years to come. Essentially the problem has arisen from the evolution of the many forms and facets of military participation in all walks of the American scene of life. The impact of the military budget upon the economy of the nation is twice felt because of the lack of regeneration that the expenditure of that budget reflects. While this is not true of all expenditures of the military, in the main its expenditures are for those end items that have little or no use or application within the civilian economy; they just go "boom" and that segment of the economy is lost forever.

The problem of the process of the military is minor-- its actual physical voice can be effectively stilled by legislative process. It is the factual force of the military machine that is awesome. Some label it "creeping militarism,"³¹ the process by which the civilian Secretary, after but few

³⁰Smith, op. cit., p. 102.

³¹Lasswell, loc. cit.

months in harness, becomes imbued with the spirit of the military service which he represents and becomes its champion, loudly heralding the valiant record of that particular service, championing its military causes with a vigor that the seasoned military professional saves for more arduous military campaigns, all to the extent that he forgets that his office charges him with the responsibility to exert control over the service for the benefit of the people rather than to afford the military service a new and politically strong champion of its desires. The maintenance of the constitutional principle of civilian supremacy must be founded upon formal rules and procedures such as the presently strengthened executive and legislative budgetary control, the executive appointive powers in appointing strong representative civilian Secretaries of the services, the specific allocation of responsibilities by the legislative branch and all of the actual rules and procedures which govern civil and military relationships in their multitudinous and diverse situations. Civilian supremacy must be precisely defined and vigorously defended, not as only a formal principle, but in the actual day to day official and personal conduct of civil and military personnel as they go about each day's business.

There is no possibility today, if there ever was, of achieving a neat and precise dividing line between political and military considerations in the concrete situations that face us around the world. In fact, it is more complicated than that: there are no lines of clear demarcation among the military, economic, political and psychological aspects of any complex world problem.

We live in a world of bipolarized power. There are only two centers of consequence and these, unhappily for mankind, represent irreconcilable political systems. This means that the two centers must inevitably compete for the rest of the world, because neither can permit the other to organize the rest of the world against it. The cold war is in essence a struggle for the third areas, the areas in between the two great powers. . . . The United States is now at the very center of that power struggle, whereas in the past we have been on the fringes.³²

Military objectives may be incompatible with nonmilitary objectives, requiring an immediate decision by the controlling authority. These decisions must be made from competing techniques or strategies--the use of military force as opposed to diplomatic or economic persuasion, or total military endeavors versus limited 'police' actions. Military techniques may drastically affect the planned nonmilitary objectives of the executive and the legislator.

Thus the problem becomes one of coordination, the proper blending of the functions, information and viewpoints, of the military and civilian strata of activity all directed toward the one course for the ship of state which will truly be for the common welfare of the people. The merging of the civilian and military elements toward a successful fruition of effort must retain the principle of civilian supremacy, yet not to the extent that the voice of the military is drowned out completely. The military should not be forced to resort to political activity in order to preserve its position. To both the career civil servant ranking below the political appointee and the military regular, such a course is fraught

³²Hoopes, op. cit., p. 225.

only with early oblivion or the loss of usefulness in his field.

The problem of the proper role for the military in a democracy is many sided. There is not one sure panacea. Formal rules, organization and reforms are insufficient. The legislator, the executive and the military must achieve a greater awareness of the nature of the problems which arise out of their relationships and each must attain a deeper understanding of their responsibilities to each other and to the American people. The danger from the military is not, by the greatest stretch of the imagination, to be considered to be the physical usurpation of power and the creation of a military dictatorship. It is the inappropriate application of military values, information and interpretation at the vital points of the decision making processes of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government as well as the phenomenon of "creeping militarism" among civilian executives at all levels. We can conclude that the true cause of military inroads upon civilian supremacy has been the failure of civilians to discharge their responsibilities properly.

Ultimately, the major responsibility for establishing the conditions conducive to the necessary, effective and limited participation of the military in governmental decision making must rest upon the top civilian leaders, including the President of the United States.³³

The civilian must clarify the role of the military, enforce

³³B. M. Savin and R. C. Snyder, The Role of the Military in American Foreign Policy (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., 1954), p. 76.

self-restraint in political activities and enforce nonmilitary commercial and humanitarian education upon the military in order that they might be enabled to more efficiently perform their nonmilitary duties. They must continue to enforce the required checks and balances to assure adequate controls and must insist that the military conduct its affairs in an open and forthright manner as far as the national security permits, in consonance with the standard practices of commercial activities and other governmental activities. Civilians must decide for themselves what their own supremacy actually is; they must enumerate their responsibilities and insist upon their prerogatives and be accountable for their actions. They must clarify their own roles, exercise self-restraint in political activities (except for the political appointee whose very function is political), and attain a degree of military training that will allow them to understand and evaluate the military point of view and methodology.

In summation, the legislative actions directly affecting military control throughout the history of the nation have all been specifically directed at placing limits upon the extent of that control. This infers that the civilian has unlimited control possibilities but has neglected to assert them to the extent that Congress has been forced to come to his rescue by direct legislation. The civil servant and the political appointee occupying positions of authority have failed their duty to the nation in allowing the military to enlarge their

spheres of influence and lines of authority. No amount of organization or reorganization of the Defense Department will prevent this gradual usurpation of civilian powers by the military; only the greatest attention to duty and conscientiousness of effort on the part of the civilian bureaucracy will hold it in check. The power of the military rises and falls with its popularity; this popularity is dependent upon the fears of the people of the nation and those fears are governed by the degree of safety they feel for their liberties. Therefore it is incumbent upon the civilian head of the military establishment of the United States to continually insure, by whatever means possible, that the liberties of the people are not in danger from external or internal threats, if he desires to retain his rightful position of authority and control.

However, the necessity for the rise of the military to full power at times must not be disregarded. As the nation's economic sphere benefits from the elimination of marginal activities and wasteful policies by the cyclical impact of recessions and depressions so does the civilian-military bureaucracy require an occasional revolutionary house cleaning. "A nation with an inflexible military system, determined by a national constitution and controlled by civilian politicians will soon end by having no military forces in spirit or capacity."³⁴

³⁴Homer Lea, The Valor of Ignorance (Philadelphia: Curtis Co., 1942), p. 21.

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
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